而在算力欠缺的背后，更需要搞明白一个事实，那就是GPU有效算力利用率仅30%-60%。

1、博鱼手机 只挂公司名、不干实际活、不开真实证明，纯为简历好看。

马尔维纳斯群岛（英国称福克兰群岛）的主权归属问题，是英阿两国长达数十年的历史遗留问题，1982年的马岛战争更是两国之间难以抹平的历史创伤。博鱼手机德尚在新闻发布会上表示：“这支西班牙队实力极强，他们在今晚证明了这一点。

2、4年2.73亿，年薪7550万！骑士看似血亏，实则花小钱赚大钱？

今年，几家头部模型公司都推出了更为先进的模型：2月智谱发布GLM-5大模型，7月月之暗面发布高达2.8万亿参数的Kimi K3大模型。

3、葡萄队更衣室曝光：C罗痛哭，乔治娜不断进行安慰

三只星星人在跨年夜舞台上表演，表演视频在社交媒体一度刷屏，形成了极为破圈的影响力。

4、亚运会男足抽签：真死亡之组！中国、阿联酋、伊朗、朝鲜同组_网易订阅

在法国队杀入四强的征程中，他轰入8球，率领那条让全球球迷大呼过瘾的攻击线一路高歌猛进。

5、终于等到普京出手，乌不宣而战后，日本公布援助计划，俄4字回击

中场方面，虽然管理层正在积极洽谈免签格雷茨卡，但他们还想再引进一名新援，萨索洛23岁的小将科内成为重点关注的目标，他的市场价值接近2500万欧元，卡马尔达可能被加入交易。

结语 回顾这场算力战争的全景，一条清晰的逻辑线已经浮现： 算力短缺是表象，算力组织方式落后是本质。

如果GPU是算力的“大脑”，那光模块就是连接这些大脑的高速数据线，通过把电信号转成光信号，让数据在服务器之间以光速穿梭来传输海量数据。

6、世界杯最后两场比赛大胆预测：阿根廷有望卫冕，姆巴佩望蝉联金靴

谁能长期交付稳定、可用的算力，谁才真正赢得这片市场。

主教练频繁更迭，体育总监和主教练之间缺乏默契，引援思路不清晰，这些问题都严重制约了球队的发展。

7、首个AI打车正式上线 滴滴重塑出行服务的确定性

米兰本次夏季友谊赛安排的相当紧凑，不仅比赛数量多，还免不了多次长途跋涉。

双方伤停情况：西班牙有皮诺；比利时有奥纳纳、德巴斯特。

8、徐昕签约美国经纪公司，还需广东开具澄清信；徐杰特训成绩斐然

并不是所有潜在回报巨大的机会都具有凸性，凸性投资的失败概率较高，也不适合情绪较大起伏的投资者。

而且，如果同样搭载177Ah电池且出现类似故障得埃安V、埃安Y车主，大概率会发起维权，要求享受与S系列同等的延保待遇。

波兰央行今年以来已购买黄金82吨，乌兹别克斯坦、哈萨克斯坦、捷克、阿联酋、新加坡等国央行也同步跟进。

9、一岁一除夕，一年一团圆。

第一层，成长溢价。

2025年整体市场份额达21.2%，在高速数通光模块细分市场的份额进一步提升至28.1%。

10、椰子看好丰塞卡夺多个大满贯，图萨诺夫称安娃突破难个矮力量弱

本届世界杯上，镰田大地的表现更是让人眼前一亮。

更值得关注的是结构性数据，2026年Q1，中国储能电池出货约209GWh，同比增长约115%，占锂电总出货量的约40%。

1、王智峰谈扑点：赛前做了很详细的数据分析，这个就不说太多了

” 但客户不买国产设备，并不是偏见，而是理性。

2、利物浦或迎13.5亿镑重磅注资，前QPR老板财团正洽谈收购30%股份

风电、光伏项目被要求配套储能设施，但这种模式催生了大量低质量需求：储能利用率低、回报率差，电芯质量参差不齐。

3、汤尤杯｜热焰赴北欧，戎装耀汤尤！国羽 YONEX 新战衣征战霍森斯

家庭场景最具想象空间，但也最难验证。阿根廷队正式向国际足联提交申请！月之暗面不是孤例。

4、毁掉王治郅、逼姚明退役，他凭一己之力让中国男篮倒退了20年！

预测瑞士2-1拿下比赛，次选1-1。

5、震业新材完成超亿元A轮融资，招商致远、玉柴股份、海富产业基金领投｜36氪首发

（文｜出海参考，作者｜王璐，编辑｜罗文琴）Nextfin News — On July 22, latest research from Omdia showed that despite total market shipments dropping by over ten percent in the second quarter, Vivo—excluding its iQOO sub-brand—maintained its top position in the Indian smartphone market with 6.3 million units shipped. Yet despite its strength in the market, Vivo was unable to keep full control over its manufacturing plants in India. There is an unwritten law in the corporate world that market share acts as a moat and scale brings bargaining power. But in India, Vivo has just seen that principle turned on its head—and in a remarkably brutal fashion. On July 9, an official approval was finally granted. Dixon Technologies announced to the stock exchange that Vivo India received a clearance letter issued on July 8 by India’s Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade. Under this approval, the manufacturing operations Vivo built over twelve years in India will formally be folded into a joint venture controlled fifty-one percent by a local partner. According to industry analyses, the new entity has a paid-up capital of just fifty million rupees—around three and a half million yuan—yet it is taking over a mega-factory designed for an annual capacity of over one hundred million units and backed by a workforce of more than ten thousand employees. Viewed in isolation, this transaction reads like a story of loss. But when placed back into the context of Vivo’s global footprint, its true nature changes entirely. India remains Vivo’s largest overseas market, ranking first in 2025 with 32.1 million shipments and a twenty-one percent market share, accounting for roughly one-third of the brand's total global volume. Overseas operations already contribute more than half of Vivo's global revenue, with targets set to raise that share to sixty percent this year and seventy percent by 2027. This shift in India does not merely affect a single regional market; it alters the structural load-bearing pillar of Vivo’s entire global strategy. With the Indian chapter coming to a close, Vivo now faces far more practical questions about its future: What exactly did this equity restructuring change, and how will the brand navigate its next phase of globalization? A Three-and-a-Half-Million Yuan Outlay for a Three-Hundred-Billion Revenue Business By securing a fifty-one percent controlling stake, Dixon leveraged its position to capture a cash cow with an annual revenue potential estimated between two hundred fifty billion and three hundred billion rupees—roughly twenty-one billion to twenty-five billion yuan. This revenue guidance originates directly from Dixon’s own management team. As early as May, Dixon founder Sunil Vachani revealed that the joint venture would handle approximately two-thirds of Vivo’s smartphone sales in India, representing over twenty million units annually. JPMorgan further projects that the joint venture will add around eleven million smartphone shipments in fiscal year 2027, scaling up to approximately twenty-two million units annually across fiscal years 2028 and 2029. From India's perspective, this outcome represents a decisive policy victory. Looking back at Vivo’s expansion abroad, its capital deployment in India consisted of substantial physical investments. According to an official press release issued by Vivo India in April 2023, the company outlined a total investment plan of seventy-five billion rupees. The first phase called for thirty-five billion rupees by the end of 2023, of which twenty-four billion had already been allocated alongside plans to inject an additional eleven billion rupees by year-end. The new facility in Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh, spans roughly 169 acres—a site acquired back in 2018 that officially went into operation in mid-2024. It currently holds an annual production capacity of sixty million units, with plans to double that figure to one hundred twenty million upon full completion, rivaling the footprint of Samsung’s largest manufacturing plant in the country. By 2018, Vivo's earlier facility was already generating a monthly output of around one million units while employing nearly ten thousand local workers. What do these figures truly signify? They demonstrate that Vivo was never just a consumer brand in India; it had built an end-to-end manufacturing system, a local supply chain, and a massive employment ecosystem. The company replicated its battle-tested Chinese ground-sales model across India, extending from major metropolitan shopping centers down to rural retail shops across roughly seventy thousand touchpoints. It even transformed India into an export hub, shipping Indian-made smartphones to Thailand and Saudi Arabia for the first time in 2022, with export targets exceeding one million units in 2023. Yet after 2024, every one of these capital investments transformed into a distinct disadvantage at the negotiating table. Faced with mounting regulatory pressure, Vivo initiated discussions in 2024 with major domestic players including Tata Group, Murugappa Group, and Dixon Technologies to explore joint ventures or contract manufacturing options, though early negotiations stalled. In December 2024, Vivo signed a non-binding term sheet with Dixon Technologies, initiating a protracted government approval process that dragged on for nineteen months. Upon closing, the joint venture will purchase selected manufacturing assets from Vivo for an undisclosed amount, sign dedicated production and packaging agreements with Vivo India, handle a substantial share of its OEM orders, and retain the flexibility to manufacture for third-party brands down the line. With an initial capital commitment of just 25.5 million rupees, Dixon gains access to established assembly lines, skilled workers, an integrated supply chain, and guaranteed orders from a brand selling over thirty million phones a year. In return, Vivo retains only the right to continue selling smartphones in the Indian market alongside a forty-nine percent financial yield on equity. Using a newly incorporated entity with a registered capital of merely fifty million rupees to take control of an advanced industrial plant capable of producing over one hundred million units annually is virtually unprecedented in global business history. Vivo understood the gravity of the concessions, but faced with severe regulatory constraints, it was left with few alternatives. Why Did Stronger Sales Lead to Heavier Constraints? Under standard market conditions, Vivo’s operational execution in India was textbook perfect. According to data from market research firm Omdia, Vivo—excluding iQOO—led the Indian smartphone market throughout 2025 with 32.1 million shipments and a twenty-one percent market share, marking a nineteen percent year-over-year growth rate. Samsung trailed in second place with twenty-three million units and a fifteen percent share. By the fourth quarter, Vivo widened its lead even further, shipping 7.9 million units in a single quarter to capture twenty-three percent of the market. Securing the top spot in the world's second-largest smartphone market—a region absorbing roughly one hundred fifty-four million devices annually—should have been a landmark corporate victory after twelve years of dedicated effort. However, as policy priorities shifted unexpectedly, the very capital-heavy assets Vivo spent years building transformed into immobilized leverage against the company. In April 2020, India enacted Press Note 3, requiring case-by-case government review for all direct foreign investments originating from countries sharing a land border. This rule effectively blocked capital injection channels for Chinese entities. Over the following years, regulatory scrutiny targeting Chinese smartphone manufacturers steadily intensified. In July 2022, authorities accused Vivo India of illicitly remitting 624.76 billion rupees back to China under the guise of tax avoidance. Vivo was hardly the only brand reshaped by this changing regulatory framework. Enforcement agencies froze 55.51 billion rupees of Xiaomi India’s assets in a dispute that remains unresolved; OPPO received a customs tax demand totaling 43.89 billion rupees; Transsion's manufacturing subsidiary, Ismartu India, surrendered a 50.1 percent controlling stake to Dixon; and HKC’s joint venture with Dixon was approved under a seventy-four to twenty-six equity structure. Faced with these conditions, Vivo was forced into a harsh binary choice: abandon its sunk costs and hand over billions of rupees in physical plants and distribution networks, or accept majority control by a local partner in exchange for permission to remain in the market. The restructuring struck directly at the primary engine of Vivo’s international business. India is not just another regional market for Vivo; it is its largest overseas pillar. In March of last year during the Boao Forum for Asia, Vivo COO Hu Baishan emphasized two key realities to Bloomberg: India is Vivo's most critical international market, and with overseas sales contributing over half of total revenues, the company is aiming for sixty percent in 2026 and seventy percent by 2027. In essence, the restructuring in India does not just adjust a local subsidiary; it alters the foundational premise of Vivo’s global expansion story. The "deep localization" playbook—building local plants, hiring local workforces, and cultivating local component ecosystems—long viewed as an ideal blueprint for overseas expansion, saw its ownership structure unilaterally rewritten in its most prominent market. Without Direct Plant Ownership in India, How Will Vivo Secure One-Third of Its Global Footprint? From a strategic standpoint, Vivo officially characterizes its international methodology as "More Local, More Global." The strategy relies on manufacturing localization through plants in markets like India and Brazil; marketing localization via major cultural partnerships ranging from the Indian Premier League to official sponsorships at the UEFA European Championship; and channel localization by exporting its field-sales distribution networks. The effectiveness of this approach is undeniable, as evidenced by Vivo holding the top market position in both India and Indonesia. Yet Vivo’s challenges in India expose the inherent vulnerabilities of this model: an over-concentration in specific regional markets and the property-rights risk associated with capital-heavy physical infrastructure. Pushing "More Local" to its logical extreme means anchoring factories, workforces, and supply chain assets entirely within foreign legal jurisdictions. Under favorable conditions, these assets form competitive barriers; during regulatory shifts, they turn into operational exposure. The deeper Vivo planted its roots in India over twelve years, the less leverage it retained during structural negotiations. Another challenge lies in Vivo's limited footprint across premium segments and developed Western markets. In discussions with Bloomberg, Hu Baishan noted that Vivo has paused expansion into developed regions like the United States and Western Europe, where carrier channels and Apple hold dominant positions, preferring instead to consider entering via new product categories over a three-to-five-year horizon. In India, the focus shifts toward expanding presence in the premium segment above six hundred dollars. In short, Vivo’s international expansion remains focused primarily on mid-to-entry segments across emerging markets, offering thinner profit margins. A six percent decline in Southeast Asian regional shipments in 2025 serves as a clear reminder of these market dynamics. So where does the company go from here? Part of the answer is already visible in Vivo’s recent strategic adjustments. First, Vivo is reframing its presence in India, shifting from a direct asset-owning manufacturer to a brand, technology, and distribution coordinator. This setup preserves market share, protects cash flow, maintains a forty-nine percent financial yield, and allows its premium product plans to proceed as intended. This structural pivot is not mere external speculation; it is explicitly defined by the mechanics of the joint venture agreement. According to regulatory filings submitted by Dixon, the joint venture is mandated to carry out three specific operational functions: acquire selected manufacturing assets from Vivo, execute contract manufacturing and packaging agreements with Vivo India, and fulfill OEM orders—initially covering roughly two-thirds of Vivo’s local sales volume before opening up capacity to third-party brands. In other words, the joint venture functions as a contract manufacturer, while product R&D, branding, pricing strategy, and retail distribution remain controlled by Vivo India. Holding a forty-nine percent equity stake, Vivo transitions to an equity accounting model rather than full revenue consolidation while retaining proportional board representation to safeguard its governance voice. Simply put: manufacturing operations transfer to a locally controlled partner, while the commercial brand and retail business remain firmly in Vivo's hands. Maintaining market leadership, preserving operational cash flow, and collecting a forty-nine percent share of manufacturing profits represents a practical compromise designed to minimize disruption. Second, Vivo is actively establishing a multi-hub manufacturing and brand strategy. In late May 2025, Vivo launched its product line in São Paulo, Brazil, under the Jovi sub-brand name. Because the "Vivo" trademark was already registered by local telecom operator Telefônica, the company adapted by entering under an alternate brand identity. Manufacturing was assigned to a local partner, GBR, with production lines established in the Manaus Free Trade Zone that went operational in January 2025. Complemented by established market positions in Colombia, Chile, and Peru, Latin America is emerging as Vivo's next core strategic region. The Brazilian operating model serves as a template tailored for the post-India era: brand names can adapt, manufacturing can be outsourced to regional assembly partners, and market entry moves forward without exposing heavy physical assets to single-jurisdiction legal risk. The experience in India delivers a clear lesson on corporate asset ownership: deep operational localization alone is no longer an absolute defense, making governance structure and geographic diversification essential indicators of long-term resilience.7月24日，旭阳新材IPO即将上会。

6、14分3板！她是国家队一年级新生，敢打敢拼，有望成苗立杰接班人

各大国资合规部彻底炸了锅！ 一方面，监管要求整改清退“名股实债”；另一方面，现实更加骨感——那些被投的创业公司，账上早就没钱了。

热身赛同样三战全胜，先后击败加纳、韩国和突尼斯，状态正佳。

当C罗首发时，葡萄牙的整体球风变得卡顿，中场推进滞涩，因为全队必须迁就他静态等待的踢法。

7、首钢放弃顶薪先生！巅峰场均14分，引众豪门争抢，有望回归老东家

计算能力与存储能力增长速度的巨大落差，使得数据供应速度远远赶不上GPU计算速度，一道越来越宽的"内存墙"由此形成。

许多基金规模只有两三千万，除了投了一两个当地的“关系户”项目，或者干脆空转吃管理费外，毫无效率可言。

8、穿暴汗服能减脂？别被骗了！

对此，滔搏多个线上官方旗舰店客服均回应称，没有接到相关降价通知。

值得注意的是，面壁智能的端侧大模型首次进入三星全球旗舰产品线，这是国产端侧大模型首次进入国际头部手机厂商的全球旗舰产品。

阿根廷则拥有大赛冠军底蕴与梅西这个历史级变量，硬仗韧性不容小觑。

那天早上，周远在上班的地铁上刷到了这条新闻。